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The Challenges of Religious Freedom in Post-Transition Hong Kong 
 
Aaron Bellows 
 
 
Introduction 
In its campaign to become the capital of Asia, Hong Kong has undergone rapid 
economic development.  Banking systems have been modernized while competitive 
businesses have attracted large sums of foreign investment.  But despite this growth over 
the past several decades, certain civil liberties remain underdeveloped in Hong Kong.  
Religious freedom, which measures the strength of democracy and the rule of law, is 
under particular strain.  When Hong Kong was reclaimed by Chinese sovereignty on July 
1, 1997, it became a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of a nation that has been 
highly suspicious of large organized groups, which are typically established by religious 
institutions. 
The authoritarian leadership of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) regards 
religion as “superstition” and has a global reputation of discouraging spiritual groups like 
the Falun Gong, whose millions of members around the world blend Buddhism and 
Taoism in a unique meditative practice.1 The Department of Public Security of the PRC’s 
central government imposed a strict ban on the Falun Gong on July 22, 1999, nearly three 
months after some 10,000 members of the group – mostly housewives, retirees, and 
government bureaucrats – staged a non-violent protest at the Zhongnanhai, the home of 
                                                 
1 Falun Gong, which means “law wheel” in English, is the popular name for a set of physical and moral 
qigong (self-improvement) principles known as Falun Dafa.  The physical aspect of Falun Dafa consists of 
a number of slow-motion exercises that supposedly promote good health.  Since the moral aspect of Falun 
Dafa includes Buddhist and Taoist ideas, the spiritual group is fundamentally different from other Chinese 
meditative practices like Tai Chi.  Falun Dafa handbooks teach readers how to attain a life of “truth, 
benevolence, and forbearance,” and under these three decrees, members of the practice have developed 
strong beliefs about politics, the environment, medicine, and money. (Hongzhi, Falun Dafa…, p. 2)  Falun 
Gong began in 1992 under the direction of Li Hongzhi.  Today, less than one percent of Hong Kong’s 
population is comprised of Falun Gong members. 
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the communist leadership.  Chinese authorities fear that a group capable of staging the 
largest protest in Beijing since the 1989 pro-democracy movement can mobilize their 
peaceful cause to another purpose.  For instance, President Jiang Zemin’s administration 
claims that the Falun Gong, which outnumbers all 64.5 million members of the PRC’s 
communist party, gathers international anti-China support that undermines national unity 
and destabilizes socialist control. (Nordlinger)  However, spokespersons for the Falun 
Gong insist that tens of thousands of adherents have been detained and tortured in labor 
camps and mental hospitals for “re-education.”  The group also says that by July 2002, 
over 430 members have been killed in police custody. (“Falun Gong Followers 
Protest…”)  
Although Beijing’s ban on the Falun Gong is what the U.S. State Department 
describes as “the largest crackdown since the Cultural Revolution,” the spiritual group is 
not illegal in Hong Kong. (U.S. Department of State)  It is critical that the SAR 
government is not pressured by the mainland’s ban and continues to allow the group to 
operate freely under a “one country, two systems” policy.  The framers of Hong Kong’s 
Basic Law expected spiritual groups to easily adapt to the socio-political systems after 
the Sino-British transition, but a number of factors are limiting religious freedom and 
making it difficult for individuals to publically practice their beliefs. 
In this article, I first describe the religious climate in Hong Kong before 1997.  I 
then discuss some historical aspects of Chinese rule and the current religious policies of 
Hong Kong’s new atheist leadership.  I examine how repression on the mainland is 
making religious activity unpopular in Hong Kong, especially for the Falun Gong, as well 
as the ways in which the SAR is impacted by political pressure from the PRC, anti-cult 
 3
legislation, and even the 2008 Olympics in Beijing.  I also discuss why economic and 
social pressures in the SAR are correlated with religious groups’ concerns that their 
protests for greater freedom have fallen onto deaf ears.  Finally, I evaluate Hong Kong’s 
prospects for attaining unlimited religious freedom under a “one country, two systems” 
policy. 
 
Hong Kong Religions Before 1997 
Before the 1997 handover, laissez-faire policies in Hong Kong permitted San Jiao 
(the triad of Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism) to co-exist with Judaism, Islam, 
Hinduism, Sikhism, and Christianity.  Within this eclectic cultural structure, western 
denominations like the Anglican and Roman Catholic Churches managed schools and 
hospitals that were financed by the colonial government. (Chunwah, p. 50)  The Christian 
churches operated about 70 percent of secondary schools before World War II and 
continued to be a chief partner with the government until 1985. (Chunwah, p. 150)  In the 
years leading up to Hong Kong’s reunification with China, the Christian churches' role in 
education began to wane, but they still provided about 20 percent of the region’s medical 
care facilities. (Chunwah, p. 157)  With these social welfare programs in place, British 
leaders looked to the churches to establish a moral society in Hong Kong.  Thus, 
Christian organizations had a pronounced voice in social reform before the transition.  
They even became watchdogs of the mass media. (Chunwah, p. 170) 
However, the Christian churches have been anxious about their future under 
Chinese rule.  Historically, China has regarded Christianity as an alien ideology and has 
been unfavorable to its assimilation into society.  For instance, the Three-Self Movement 
in the 1950s and the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s sought to expel Christian belief 
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from the country.  Thus, before 1997 many Hong Kong Christians were unwilling to 
identify with Communist China.  A 1983 survey by the Chinese University of Hong 
Kong showed that Christians in Hong Kong emphasized their Christian identity most, 
then their Hong Kong identity, and thirdly their Chinese identity. (Chunwah, p. 145)  
Among the five hundred thousand people who had left Hong Kong before the handover, 
some 20 percent were Christians. (Chunwah, p. 131) 
On the other hand, adherents of Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism – ancient 
Chinese traditions – approached 1997 with an optimistic sense of being reunited with a 
nation that has integrated their ethics and rituals into local culture.  Unlike Christianity, 
San Jiao declared that colonialism was a “national shame” that needed to be shed; 
members of Buddhist, Taoist, and Confucian sects believed that they did not have equal 
opportunities in education and lacked public recognition of their cultural festivities, such 
as Buddha’s birthday. (Chunwah, p. 140) 
 
After the Handover: Religions under China’s Jurisdiction 
Religion and “Superstition” 
Civil unrest in China dates back about 2200 years to the Ch’in dynasty (221-207 
B.C.); yet over this great span of time, countless uprisings have generally seemed to 
follow a similar pattern. (Chesneaux, p. 21)  The tradition of revolt in China has been 
characterized by: 1) large-scale operations, 2) an overthrow of the established ruling 
class, 3) a struggle for autonomy, and 4) an emergence of religious movements which 
replace a declining socio-economic system with an alternative. (Chesneaux, pp. 9,67)  
One of the most famous anti-establishment revolts was the Taiping Rebellion of 1850-64, 
when a charismatic Christian missionary declared himself evangelical king of hundreds 
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of thousands of businessmen, rural folk, and peasants who sought relief from population 
pressure and imperial Manchu control. (Gray, p. 59)  Buddhist and Taoist factions 
executed the egalitarian ideals set forth by nationalist banners bearing a slogan that was 
capable of mobilizing the discontented masses: “Restore justice in the name of Heaven!" 
(Chesneaux, pp. 16, 44)  It took 14 years and millions of lives to suppress the revolt; but 
thousands of subversive sects, known as secret societies (like the Triads or the Elder 
Brother Society), still remained powerful towards the end of the nineteenth century. 
(Chesneaux, p. 44)  Their sheer numbers – often united by the belief in spiritual salvation 
– posed a serious threat to the established order. 
Insurrection continued into the twentieth century.  Sun Yat-Sen and counter-
revolutionary groups like the Chinese Youth Party, the National Salvation Movement, 
and the Third Force all sought to overthrow established regimes. (Chesneaux, p. 45; 
Tianshi, p. 271)  As the 1950s approached, Chinese citizens protested the collapse of 
capitalism and rallied international support for a pluralistic form of government. 
(Chesneaux, p. 79; Tianshi, pp. 270-71)  The pro-democracy movement, which 
culminated in the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, was no doubt driven by memories of 
past insurrection; it mirrored the student protests against the Beijing government during 
the 1919 May Fourth Movement.  From 1989 to 1990, labor organizations, students, 
state-sponsored newspapers, and even staff of PRC-owned businesses rallied against 
communism under the auspices of the Alliance in Support of the Patriotic Democratic 
Movement in China. 
This long history of mass revolt has created an atmosphere of permanent 
insecurity in China. (Chesneaux, p. 20)  As a result, the Chinese government has grown 
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increasingly suspicious of large, organized groups of people.  Labor unions and student 
movements pose a significant threat to authoritarian stability, so they have been curtailed.  
Likewise, the central government has tried to protect itself from religious institutions that 
are able to unite and mobilize the masses.  The PRC’s 1982 revised Constitution subjects 
religious groups to licensing, a technique that manages any organization in a position to 
challenge the government. 
A religion is licensed under Article 36 of the Chinese Constitution only if 
government cadres decide that it raises social responsibility and spreads patriotic and 
socialist awareness.  In addition, the Religious Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs can license and register a religion if it is a discipline or an ideology that can be 
named as one of the universal faiths: Catholicism, Protestantism, Islam, Buddhism, or 
Taoism. (“U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom”) 
However, an approved religion is strictly supervised by local government 
officials.  For instance, every religious institution must have a distinct set of texts, which 
can be collected, and cadres must be able to count all of its adherents.  The financial 
records of any acceptable religious group are open to the government, its contacts with 
other religious institutions are restricted, youth activities are prohibited, evangelical 
worship is criminal, and religious materials and education are censored. (“U.S. 
Commission on International Religious Freedom”)  Religious practices cannot be a part 
of everyday life, and rituals that include the burning of incense and praying before statues 
of gods are deemed illegal. (Feuchtwang, p. 168) 
If these legal requirements are not met, then a religious group is denied 
registration and its members are criminalized.  The Chinese Criminal Code of 1979 says 
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that supporters of unregistered religions undermine national unity because their 
unlicensed beliefs may be under the control of foreign countries and used for “counter-
revolutionary purposes,” including the disruption of public order, health, and education. 
(Feuchtwang, p. 167)  However, in the case of the unregistered Falun Gong, millions may 
be practicing their beliefs underground, where Chinese authorities are unable to detect 
them. 
To discourage religions that are not officially recognized, Chinese authorities 
have been referring to unapproved religious beliefs as “superstitions.”  The Cultural 
Bureau, which promotes Chinese festivities that contribute to the economy, is responsible 
for shutting down religious activities – no matter how economically beneficial they may 
be – if they attract large crowds for “superstitious” practices. (Feuchtwang, p. 169)  
Nevertheless, religious popularity continued to grow during the democratic movements 
of the late 1980s.  Uncontrolled reconstruction of mosques, monasteries, temples, and 
churches that were destroyed during Mao’s Cultural Revolution prompted the State 
Council to release the Notice on Further Tackling Certain Problems of Religious Work, 
which officially declared that religious freedom cannot justify illegal activities. 
(Feuchtwang, p. 168)   The government notice also set in motion the drafting of a new 
Criminal Code.  The new set of laws, issued in 1997, contain a number of regulations 
regarding unregistered religions and public order.  Article 300, for example, prohibits 
“superstitious sects, secret societies, and evil organizations” from sabotaging state laws 
or harming or cheating others.  Similarly, Article 105 is an anti-subversion law that 
protects national socialist unity. (Feuchtwang, p. 171)  Local cadres decide whether or 
not a group is disrupting public order, and their decisions are strongly influenced by the 
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political climate in Beijing. (Feuchtwang, p. 168)  Because the central government felt 
that the Falun Gong was disobeying these national security laws, the entire group was 
outlawed as a superstitious cult in 1999. 
 
Political Pressure from Beijing 
“One country, two systems” prohibits mainland lawmakers from implementing 
communist policies in Hong Kong, but there is an emerging congruity between the ways 
in which the PRC and Hong Kong are approaching human rights.  A week before the 
handover, Tung Chee-hwa, Hong Kong’s chief executive, delivered a speech comparing 
the policies of Hong Kong and the PRC in which he said, “If it is good for Hong Kong, it 
is good for China; if it is good for China, it must be good for Hong Kong” (As quoted in 
Chunwah, p. 119).  Accordingly, while the PRC has been using public order laws to exert 
control over certain religious activities, Hong Kong has shown increasing interest in a 
provision of the Basic Law that deals with counter-revolutionary affairs.  This provision, 
known as Article 23, was conceived by a 59-member Basic Law Drafting Committee of 
the National People’s Congress in April 1988, and was originally intended to protect the 
Hong Kong government from subversion (overthrowing the government by force).  
However, by the time that the article was promulgated in 1990, “subversion” was 
expanded to include other forms of national disunity.  Article 23 reads: 
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall enact laws 
on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, 
subversion against the Central People's Government, or theft of state 
secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies from 
conducting political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political 
organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with 
foreign political organizations or bodies. (Hong Kong Basic Law) 
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Although the 1988 version of the article was modified, the four security statutes – treason 
(aiding national enemies), secession (breaking off from the PRC to declare an 
independent state or allegiance to another state), sedition (inciting insurrection against the 
government), and subversion – remain broadly defined.  In addition, “subversion” and 
“secession” are not covered by common law. (“Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor”)  
There is plenty of leeway for the chief executive to propose national security laws under 
Article 23 at any time.  One possibility is a current project that the SAR government 
refers to as an “anti-cult law.”  Donald Tsang, Hong Kong’s Chief Secretary, has said  
that officials are studying a French law which outlines the way cults are punished.  The 
French anti-cult law, passed in May 2001, is two-fold: it gives the French judicial system 
the right to dissolve new religious groups when their leaders are convicted of a crime, and 
it outlaws brainwashing.2  
An anti-cult law is a form of licensing, and if burgeoning spiritual groups like the 
Falun Gong are required to be certified and licensed, they will have to contend with state 
supervision. (Beckford, p. 284)  Like many of the PRC’s licensing laws, which strictly 
monitor large numbers of people in organized religions, legislation under Article 23 
would allow the SAR government to control new religious movements by granting 
government officials the capacity to distinguish acceptable movements from those that 
incite national disunity.  Officials have said that Falun Gong members upset public order 
when they conduct their slow-motion exercises in public parks and stage public protests 
                                                 
2 French citizens are not allowed to distribute messages that intentionally or unintentionally exploit a 
person’s psychological or physical well-being.  There is a significant penalty for knowingly taking 
advantage of “the weak, ignorant, or vulnerable” due to their age, illness, or disability.  Along these lines, it 
is also an offense to influence an individual by using “repeated pressures” or “techniques likely to alter 
judgement.” Penalties are more severe if the de facto leader of a cult violates one of the statutes of the anti-
cult law. (French Anti-Cult Law) 
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outside of state offices.  These activities allegedly have, among other minor offenses, 
disrupted the flow of traffic. 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that the freedom to 
adopt a religion of choice can be restricted by laws specifically aimed to “protect public 
safety, order, [and] national security.” (International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights)  Because Article 23 signifies elevated government control, intervention, and 
monitoring of public security, the central and SAR governments can use it to justify that a 
crackdown on religious groups is within legal bounds of international policy.  For 
example, on April 21, 1999, China’s Public Security Bureau detained 71 members of 
Men Tu Hui, a religious sect, because the devotees were accused of using heresy to 
spread rumors and insurrection. (U.S. Department of State) 
Beijing has also justified its campaign to impose national security laws under 
Article 23 by citing Articles 13 and 14 of the Basic Law, which state that the central 
government is responsible for protecting civil order from foreign infiltration.  Even 
though the Basic Law states that the SAR shall enact laws “on its own,” Hong Kong’s 
Security Chief, Regina Ip, told members of the Legislative Council that Hong Kong 
would "exchange views" with China on Article 23.  Regardless, in the current political 
scheme, anti-cult legislation would be made by a SAR council whose members were 
hand-selected by Beijing rather than democratically elected in Hong Kong (direct 
elections will not take place until 2007).  Moreover, mainland politicians have rejected 
public input as Article 23 was being revised because the citizens of Hong Kong supported 
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the 1989 student protests in China.3   This lack of open legislation suggests that the SAR 
is under political pressure from Beijing to adopt laws coinciding with those in the PRC.  
In effect, Article 23 bridges the PRC’s paranoia of large organized groups to Hong 
Kong’s domestic legal system by way of a yielding chief executive. 
 
Evil Rhetoric 
While the SAR government was studying the French anti-cult law, it accelerated 
its public denouncement of the Falun Gong.  In the PRC, political leaders have been 
referring to the illegal Falun Gong as “an evil cult” since banning the group in 1999.  
Tung began toeing Beijing’s line in February 2001 when he declared that Falun Gong had 
"characteristics of an evil cult."  He said they needed watching.  Regina Ip branded Falun 
Gong a "devious organization" responsible for "heretical views,” echoing Beijing's sharp 
bombast. (Alfredson)  As the Falun Gong continued to protest China’s harsh treatment of 
the group, the SAR government became more and more pressured by an apprehensive 
Beijing.  On June 14, 2001, the chief executive explicitly told the Legislative Council, 
“The Falun Gong is in no doubt an evil cult.”  He described the Falun Gong as a tightly 
organized political group with abundant financial resources. (Li) 
According to Martin Lee, the leader of Hong Kong’s Democratic Party and a 
member of the Basic Law Drafting Committee, Tung’s broad-based comment reveals an 
intolerance of many religions.  Lee said, “If Mr. Tung can say this of the Falun Gong in 
                                                 
3 In the days leading up to the June 4 Tiananmen Square massacre (which prompted PRC public order laws 
in the first place), over one million Hong Kong citizens held pro-democracy marches and rallies with the 
Alliance in Support of the Patriotic Democratic Movement in China. (Chan, “Decolonization without 
Democracy...,” p. 167)  The pro-democracy movement was a paradigm of what Beijing now calls national 
disunity, and the central government may have a legitimate fear that a free Hong Kong can buttress anti-
government sentiment once again. 
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Hong Kong without any justification whatsoever, he could say exactly the same thing 
about the Catholic Church or the Protestant Church tomorrow.” (As quoted in Li) 
Equally important is the way in which Tung’s rhetoric represents “rule by law” 
rather than “rule of law.”  While Article 141 of the Basic Law allows “religious 
organizations to maintain and develop their relations with religious organizations 
elsewhere,” Article 23 prohibits “political organizations from establishing ties with 
foreign political organizations.” (Hong Kong Basic Law)  Tung specifically defined 
Falun Gong as a political organization, thereby eliminating its ability to maintain ties 
with the hundreds of thousands of Falun Gong groups scattered all over the world.  
Meanwhile, because Articles 13 and 14 of the Basic Law ambiguously state that the PRC 
is responsible for handling the foreign affairs and defense of Hong Kong, the central 
government can target Hong Kong-bound religious beliefs that have not been officially 
registered with the Religious Affairs Bureau.  This way, religious groups in Hong Kong 
may be prohibited from associating with their overseas counterparts. (Chunwah, p. 145)  
By the time that Tung had made his “evil cult” remark, the SAR government was 
ordering immigration authorities to bar incoming foreign Falun Gong supporters based on 
a blacklist supplied by Beijing. (Lam, “Freedom under Fire...”)  Detainment of 
blacklisted people was heightened during May 2001 to curb numerous protests at a Hong 
Kong-based international economic forum. 
Once an organization is re-defined as a politically motivated cult, the government 
is able to implement Article 23 against it.  The crackdown on the Falun Gong is one of 
many examples where Chinese authorities have “cult-ized” a group capable of subverting 
the established rule.  In fact, China has a substantial history of branding religious sects as 
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cults, and there are even a number of cases where the government has used the 1999 anti-
cult law that banned the Falun Gong to persecute other religious parties that are not 
officially approved.  One recent example deals with the “cult” labeling of the Shouters, 
an evangelical Protestant sect claiming 500,000 members, who believe in a literal 
interpretation of the Bible.  Over a two month period in 2001, a Hong Kong resident tried 
to ship over 45,000 copies of an unauthorized version of the Bible to the underground 
Local Church of the Shouters, and was initially indicted on charges of "using a cult to 
subvert the law," a crime punishable by death in China. (Pan)  This case reveals the non-
democratic implications of associating a religious group with cult activity.  It especially 
shows that any activity becomes illegal when it is affiliated with a group believed to be 
subverting the Chinese government. (“Hong Kong Human Right Monitor”)  Tung’s use 
of the “evil cult” language shows that the SAR government is beginning to adopt the kind 
of authoritarian clout that criminalized the Shouters.  It is expected that much of the 
pressure to use the cult label in Hong Kong is not arbitrary; influence will come from 
Beijing and be directed against religious organizations that refuse to worship in state-run 
churches on the mainland. (Pan)  Such conditions do not encourage the growth and 
independence of religions in Hong Kong. 
Organizations that are similar in nature to the Shouters and that may soon be 
targeted by the “evil cult” rhetoric include the Supreme Master Ching Hai International 
Association (Guanyin Famen), the International Society for Krishna Consciousness, the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, Sukyo Mahikari, and the Church of Zion.  
The possibility of cult labeling would also injure other self-improvement groups 
including Go Gong, Chi Bei Gong, Benevolence Practice, the Guan Ying School, and 
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Zhong Gong. (Schloss and Poon)  With the exception of Zhong Gong, a meditation and 
exercise group claiming 20 million members, the major distinction between these groups 
and the Falun Gong is size.  Falun Gong was singled out for political attack because, 
unlike the smaller spiritual groups, its immense membership allows it to pose a 
substantial challenge to the government’s authority. 
After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the U.S., Tung took his “evil 
cult” rhetoric to the next level; he began to call the Falun Gong an “evil cult with a 
terrorist nature” at the same time that Beijing was rallying support for an anti-terrorism 
law.  China already has a list of alleged terrorist groups, which includes the Xinjiang 
Muslim separatist organization; but in November 2001, the central and SAR governments 
wanted to draw up a new anti-terror program. (Sin-mi Hon)  Regina Ip has accepted a 
proposal to penetrate terrorist groups and activities (in addition to those declared by the 
United Nations) by legalizing a ban that would freeze terrorist assets. 
Tung justified his “evil cult” rhetoric by citing a January 2001 incident in 
Tiananmen Square, where a small group of unidentified individuals set themselves on 
fire.  Even though Falun Gong denies any affiliation with those involved, the event gave 
Tung the opportunity to make implicit links between Falun Gong and cult activity.  
Knowing that a dangerous cult (like the Branch Davidians or Heaven’s Gate) is 
commonly led by a single charismatic male, the central and SAR governments contend 
that the suicides in Tiananmen Square were orchestrated by Asiaweek’s 2001 choice as 
“the most influential man in Asia:” Li Hongzhi, the founder and world-wide leader of the 
Falun Gong.  Tung has also cited the immolation incident because destructive cults 
typically engage in mass suicides. (Robinson) 
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In addition to the public suicides, Chinese authorities maintain that the group kills 
its own membership when unhealthy Falun Gong followers reject traditional medicine in 
favor of their own supernormal abilities.  In a Falun Gong handbook, Hongzhi tells his 
disciples that “some illnesses are quite serious and exceed the confines of this world, 
rendering hospitals incapable of curing them.” (Hongzhi, Falun Gong, p. 14)  According 
to the handbook, a “Third Eye” that exists in various shapes at the center of a member’s 
forehead can diagnose disease more clearly, conveniently, and directly than a CAT scan.  
The eye is believed to be so powerful that it not only “observes the inside of a human 
body,” but also detects objects thousands of miles away. (Hongzhi, Falun Gong, p. 15)  
The handbook also states that illness is eliminated during intense slow-motion meditation 
when the energy of the universe is channeled into a Falun Gong emblem that 
“automatically spins ceaselessly in the practioner’s lower abdominal area.” (Hongzhi, 
Falun Gong, p. 15)  The spinning emblem supposedly creates a shield around the body so 
that “illness will be unable to invade again.” (Hongzhi, Falun Gong, p. 15) 
Arguing against Tung’s rhetoric relies on an important fact: people belonging to a 
destructive cult generally live together in a location that is isolated from society so that 
they may practice a self-contained system of assumptions or teachings. (Beckford, p. 81)  
The Falun Gong is not isolated at all since members frequently stage their exercise 
sessions in public parks.  The government’s accusation that they are disturbing public 
order is an indication of the group’s integration in Hong Kong society. 
 
The Olympic Bid 
Since 1997, when the Chinese State Council published a White Paper on Freedom 
of Religious Belief in China, the central and SAR governments have been trying to 
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convince the world that China’s record on human rights has improved dramatically since 
its modernization movement began in the 1970s.  In an apparent effort to show that 
religions in China are tolerated within the law, Tung recently told U.S. President George 
W. Bush that religious freedom was “alive and kicking” in Hong Kong. (Torode)  But in 
September 2000, the U.S. Congress outlined a set of eight criteria regarding human rights 
that were to be met before Permanent Normal Trade Relations would proceed in China.  
As Congress’s statement read, “China will not be selected as a host to the Olympic 
Games until human rights improve.” (“U.S. Commission on International Religious 
Freedom”)  U.S. Democrat Tom Lantos warned that an Olympic season in Beijing would 
be like the 1936 Olympics in Germany where Hitler used the international attention of the 
games to gain support for himself and his cause.  Similarly, human rights groups claimed 
that an international honor should not be awarded to a communist nation that represses 
spiritual groups like the Falun Gong.  So when Beijing was bestowed the Olympic Games 
by the International Olympic Committee in July 2001, Chinese Vice-Premier Li Lanqing 
declared that his government had scored “a great victory over the Falun Gong.” (“China 
Draws Get-Tough Message”) 
The contract between the International Olympic Committee and the Beijing Bid 
Committee stipulates that the host will lift all restrictions on the mass media during the 
Olympics.  Chinese reporters usually fear arrest when they write about the Falun Gong, 
democracy activists, and labor camps; but Wang Wei, the Secretary-General of Beijing’s 
Olympic committee, has said, “We will give complete freedom to the media to report.  
We have made guarantees to the bid committee.”  (As quoted in O’Neill) 
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In order to avoid anti-government Falun Gong protests during the Olympics, 
which would diffuse through international news services, Li Lanqing has told the country 
that it needed to “redouble its efforts” in the “long-term struggle” against the spiritual 
group. (Lam, “China Set for Long Battle...”)  Part of this effort included the conception 
of the Leading Group on Combating Cults, headed by Li Lanqing.  Under this agency, 
officials in Beijing are hastening a Maoist attack on Falun Gong; government cadres will 
be either demoted or fired based on the level of Falun Gong activity in their district, and 
schools will be required to include anti-cult lessons in their curriculums. (Lam, “China 
Set for Long Battle...”)  Alleged attempts at re-education, detainment, reform through 
labor, and even torture have reduced the number of Falun Gong protests, but authorities 
feel that they need to accelerate their campaign because the group still remains strong 
underground. 
 
Economy, Order, and Public Perceptions 
Lee Kuan Yew, a Neo-Confucian ex-Prime Minister of Singapore, has formulated 
a set of guidelines to help modern leaders operate within a strictly ordered Confucian 
social structure.  His work, known as the Lee thesis, says that economic growth is 
attenuated by the maintenance of civil and political rights.  People must put aside their 
freedoms like voting, protesting, and criticizing to maximize authoritarian efficiency.  As 
Lee has said, “The right of an individual to behave or misbehave as he pleases has come 
at the expense of orderly society.” (As quoted in Chunwah, p. 114)  A country’s sense of 
traditionalism usually determines the degree to which the Lee thesis is exercised, but 
because Hong Kong is the hotbed of Asian modernization, it would seem that the region 
would be an unlikely advocate of Lee’s ideas. 
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However, in a public speech to the Journalists’ Conference on June 2, 1997, Tung 
said that “Lee is an idol politician.” (As quoted in Chunwah, p. 115)  Hong Kong’s chief 
executive has already exhibited compliance with Lee when he said that Singapore’s 
models for education and housing would become the new models for Hong Kong. 
(Chunwah, p. 123)  Democratic activists fear that Lee’s views on civil liberties will be 
adopted by the chief executive, too.  An alliance between Tung and Lee would show that 
religious freedom, among other freedoms, may be compromised for economic 
development. 
Exacerbating this issue is the idea that human rights are not major concerns in 
Hong Kong. (DeGolyer)  A number of socio-economic facets of the region reveal that 
political reforms – including an anti-cult law – may be adopted without much public 
interference.  For instance, as Hong Kong has set out to become a key financial center of 
the world, a money-driven lifestyle has weakened public consciousness of religious 
affairs.  Since the business boom in the 1970s, Hong Kong has helped sustain the 
economic development of China, and now that the region is under Chinese sovereignty, 
its economic performance will be under increased scrutiny. (Pierce)  In addition to this 
emphasis on the national economy, citizens of Hong Kong are more concerned with 
employment, health, housing, and pollution than religion and human rights, according to 
a poll by the Hong Kong Transition Project. (DeGolyer)  Hong Kong currently has no 
active pro-religion campaign because the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic 
Law both declare that religion is legal and guaranteed.  Hong Kong has already achieved 
– at least in writing – the social autonomy pursued by other Chinese regions like Tibet 
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and Xinjiang.4  Moreover, in a June 2001 public opinion poll by the Hong Kong 
Progressive Alliance Party, 55.4 percent of those surveyed feel that the Falun Gong 
causes social disorder.  Where has the public received this negative image of the 
meditation group?  According to Falun Gong members, newspapers are transmitting false 
messages to the Chinese population.  For example, in an apparent link to Tung’s “evil 
cult” defamation, state-run PRC newspapers accused Falun Gong members of self-
immolation.  Beijing also reported that the Cable News Network was involved with the 
suicides, an implication that backs Zhu Bangzao of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, who 
has been trying to convince the Chinese people that the Falun Gong garners dangerous 
international support. 
 
Where Freedom of Religion is Headed 
The drafters of the Basic Law believed that the fundamental values of colonial 
Hong Kong would be maintained after the 1997 transition.  For instance, Article 141 says 
that “religious organizations may, according to their previous practice, continue to run 
seminaries and other schools, hospitals, and welfare institutions and to provide other 
social services.” (Hong Kong Basic Law)  Laissez-faire social policies are still intact;5 
but ironically, the religious forces that have played a significant role in stabilizing social 
order before the transition are now in danger of being perceived as challenges to 
communist authority and threats to public security.  Although there has been a resurgence 
of religious activity in China since the Cultural Revolution, the reunification of Hong 
                                                 
4 In Tibet and Xinjiang, the Chinese government’s acts of religious suppression have incited movements 
for greater autonomy, independence, and a separate state. (Feuchtwang, p. 172) 
5 Chief Secretary Donald Tsang has said, “[Hong Kong] is dealing with the Falun Gong by not dealing with 
the Falun Gong.” (As quoted in Tsang) 
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Kong with an atheist state may prove to be especially difficult for religious groups in the 
upcoming years. 
 In order for communist China to be successfully reunited with Hong Kong under 
“one country, two systems,” the Chinese leadership must strengthen its acceptance of 
social pluralism and democracy.  To become comfortable with the idea of democracy, 
Zemin and his administration must recognize that reformed democracies such as Poland, 
Hungary, Romania, and the former Soviet Union are capable of stabilizing their political 
and economic systems. (Shaozhi, p. 230) There must also be a balance between the 
number of political reformers and conservative hard-liners; but as long as Beijing has the 
power to override direct elections and universal suffrage, this possibility seems remote. 
(The resignation of Anson Chan, a SAR leader known to oppose Beijing’s intervention in 
Hong Kong affairs, is a sign that the political balance is being tipped in Beijing’s behalf). 
Some political scientists believe that non-cooperation with Chinese authorities 
sustains the democratic cause.  In November 2001, 35 Falun Gong members from 10 
different countries staged a non-violent protest in Tiananmen Square.  This demonstration 
against China’s crackdown was the largest protest by Westerners in the Square’s 
revolutionary history. (“China Expels Falun Gong Protestors”)  Nevertheless, the number 
of Falun Gong protests in Tiananmen Square and the rest of the mainland have declined 
since the 2001 anniversary of the July 1999 ban. (“Protests Mark Falun Gong 
Anniversary”)  This drop may indicate that Beijing’s crackdown is working.  
Consequently, over the next few critical years, there may be a marked migration of 
protestors to someplace nearby where they can act without fear.  An ideal setting would 
be a democratic Hong Kong.  However, with new anti-subversion and anti-cult legislation 
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under Article 23 of the Basic Law, protestors may find themselves packing their bags for 
a place that is outside of China’s jurisdiction. 
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